This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.
16
CHINA.
CONFIDENTIAL.
| F 6818/4638/10]
IVE S
-O. P 1922
#00FFICE
No. 1.
27
[August 25, 1927.]
SECTION 1.
Sir M. Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain.-(Received August 12.)
Peking, June 15, 1927.
(No. 623.) Sir,
will already be fully acquainted with them, there is no need for me to recapitulate the sequence of events following the firing upon steamship "Lungshan by Cantonese soldiers on the 16th May last between Hong Kong and Canton.
AS you
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2. There are, however, certain points in connection with the incident to which I desire to invite attention.
3. It was the first occasion requiring the application of the instructions regarding retaliatory action sent to the Naval Commander-in-chief by the Admiralty in their telegrams Nos. 812-815 of the 11th May. And it demonstrated what I had anticipated would be the case, namely, the need for some agreed procedure in applying these instructions. Happily, the "Lungshan" incident had a satisfactory termination, but a serious hitch might easily have occurred and, indeed, at one moment threatened to occur owing to the multiplicity of authorities concerned and a misunderstanding as to the parts which they were called upon to play.
In his
4. I, myself, while the incident was being discussed, was at sea between Tien-tsin and Shanghai and only partially in touch with the situation. telegrams to me Nos. 47 and 48, which I received by wireless, the acting British consul-general at Canton reported the incident, stated the demands which he recommended and suggested a time-limit for their fulfilment, failing which retaliatory action should be taken. He did not propose any specific form of retaliatory action, but merely suggested that as a preparatory measure a cruiser should be stationed at Whampoa. I fully realised that under the Admiralty instructions the final responsibility for deciding whether and in what form retaliatory action should be taken lay with the Commander-in-chief and not with myself. But in order to assist Admiral Tyrwhitt in coming to his decision I telegraphed to him on the 17th May that I agreed with the action taken and proposed to Mr. Brenan as reported in his telegrams Nos. 47 and 48. My telegram to Admiral Tyrwhitt I repeated in the usual routine way to Mr. Brenan so that he should be kept au courant; but the telegram was addressed to the admiral and not to Mr. Brenan. When, on the 20th May, Mr. Brenan telegraphed to me (I was still at sea) that he had presented his proposed demands to the local authorities and had fixed the 23rd May as the limit for the full compliance, failing which retaliatory action was to be taken, I could only assume that he had acted after obtaining the concurrence of the Commander-in-chief, who was then on the Yang-tsze. When I arrived in Shanghai I was somewhat perturbed to find that this was at least doubtful, and in order to clear up the situation I sent on the 21st May my telegram No. 1 to the Commander-in-chief, which was repeated to you as No. 6.
5. Mr. Brenan had not, in fact, obtained the concurrence of the Commander- in-chief before presenting his demands, but had regarded the repetition to him of my telegrams to the admiral of the 17th May as sufficient authority for proceeding. In this he was, of course, in error, though the misunderstanding was not unnatural in the circumstances. His Majesty's consular officers naturally look to me and not to any other authority in China for their instructions. Mr. Brenan had arranged the length of the time-limit and come to an understanding regarding retaliatory action with the Senior Naval Officer, Hong Kong, who had not, it seems, obtained the sanction of the Commander-in-chief.
6. Meanwhile, the situation became further involved by the action of the Governor of Hong Kong, who, supported by the Hong Kong Defence Committee, urged that both the demands on the Cantonese authorities and the action to be taken in the event of non-compliance should be considerably more drastic. Sir Cecil Clementi's recommendations I did not see until I reached Shanghai, as they were in a cypher which I did not possess, and I could not therefore read them on board H.M.S.*“ Foxglove." Had I seen them I feel that I should have had no alternative
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